I. INTRODUCTION
Unionism and collective bargaining in the federal sector present a paradox.
1 Under federal-sector labor law, employees have a right to form unions and, in most cases, engage in some form of collective bargaining with their employing agency. Like almost all government employees, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 19:nn federal employees have no right to strike. 2 However, unlike labor relations in private companies and in many state and local governments, in most federal agencies there is no collective bargaining over wages or pensions, healthcare, and other major employee benefits because these matters are governed by federal statute or regulation. 3 Moreover, employees are under no legal obligation to pay union dues or an agency fee to the union representative; all such payments are voluntary and cannot be made a condition of employment. Federal-sector unions are under a statutory duty to represent fairly all employees in the bargaining unit, whether or not they are union members or pay a fee of any kind. 4 Federal employees also have significant rights by statute not to be discharged or disciplined without cause and the ability to contest a discharge or other significant discipline in an adjudication (with or without union representation) before an independent federal agency, the Merit System Protection Board, 5 or if a discrimination claim is involved, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 6 The paradox is why federal employees select union representation and in many cases voluntarily pay for such representation. Indeed, the paradox is so intriguing that Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker (perhaps ironically) referred to the federal sector as his model for cutting back public-sector bargaining rights in his state. 7 Before beginning to address the paradox, some data first. As Table 1 2. 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7) (2012). 3. Federal employees have the right "to engage in collective bargaining with respect to conditions of employment through" an exclusively bargaining representative. Id. § 7102(2). "Conditions of employment" are "personnel policies, practices, and matters" that "affect[] working conditions." Id. § 7103(a)(14). They do not include "wages and other matters pertaining to compensation of federal employees. . indicates, in 2014, 22.9 percent of employees in the federal sector (excluding employees of the U.S. Postal Service who can bargain over pay and employee benefits) 8 were covered by collective bargaining agreements. We will call the percentage of employees covered by collective agreements the "union representation rate." This compares favorably with the privatesector representation rate of 7.4 percent but is less than one-third of the postal-service representation rate of 68.2 percent and falls considerably short of the state-government (32.8 percent) and local-government (45.5 percent) representation rates. , created a hybrid scheme including federal private-sector labor law provisions for representation elections ( § § 1203-1204) and final, binding interest arbitration mechanism for the resolution of labor disputes without a statutory right to strike ( § 1207). The principal labor organizations are the American Postal Workers Union (APWU), AFL-CIO; the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC), AFL-CIO; the National Rural Letter Carriers Association (NRLCA); and the National Postal Mail Handlers Union (Mail Handlers), a division of the Laborers' International Union of North American, AFL-CIO. The APWU represents postal clerks, maintenance employees, motor vehicle operators and mechanics, and certain information technology and accounting services employees; the NALC represents city letter carriers; the NRLCA represents rural letter carriers; and the Mail Handlers represents mail handlers. Most represented employees work in the Postal Service's mail processing facilities.
9. There is a basis for linking postal-service employees with other federal-sector employee because while the former can engage in full collective bargaining (albeit with compulsory interest arbitration in lieu of a statutory right to strike, see 39 U.S.C. § 1207(c)-(d) (2012)), they, too, work free of a union-security or agency-fee obligation, see id. §1209(a). If we were examining the free-rider effect alone, postal employees would be included, but because they can engage in economic bargaining, the "paradox" identified in this paper is less striking. The focus of this paper is on the phenomenon of voluntary unionism in the absence of economic bargaining rights. For the effect of state and local "meet and confer" laws that fall short of collective bargaining, see Richard B. Because of the prevalence of union-security clauses (which require employees to pay union dues or their financial equivalent as a condition of employment) in states which have not outlawed such a provision, 11 the percentage of union members among represented employees -termed here the union-membership rate -is typically a bit larger but not much more so than the union-representation rate in the private sector and states allowing union-security obligations.
This near equivalence between representation rate and membership rate is plainly not true of non-postal federal government employees where the difference between the rates is 4.3 percentage points, or 117,000 workers (and potential members). Yet it remains the case that a little over half of a million workers or four out of five represented non-postal federal 10 This paper explores why 20 percent of federal government employees (excluding postal) are apparently willing to select a collective representative and pay an agency fee even though the representative cannot bargain over compensation and most employee benefits. 13 Once a relationship with a union bargaining agent has begun, its continuation is less difficult to explain. Many federal-sector bargaining (hence, electoral) units are quite large beause they were initially certified as agency-wide 12. See also infra (2003)) and categories of employees (see 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b) (2012) (exclusions from appropriate bargaining units), id. § 7112(c)) excluded either by statute or executive order from collective bargaining authority; these workforces perhaps should be removed from the denominator in calculating union representation or membership rates. However, all labor laws, both in the government and private sectors, have exclusions from coverage, and it is difficult to assume the exclusions are significantly larger in the federal sector than in other sectors. The CPS data does not adjust for such exclusions.
13. Bargaining over compensation and employee benefits does occur at the U. 14 Employees can after a year revoke their authorization of a checkoff of union dues from their paycheck by filing an easily available form. 15 However, they cannot readily exit from the bargaining relationship unless a rival union appears on the scene willing to shoulder the expense of an agency-wide contest.
To add to the paradox of federal-sector unionism, unions generally are not able to obtain bargaining authority without winning a secret-ballot election. Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the principal statute governing labor relations in private companies, an employer can enter into a collective-relationship with a labor organization that is "designated or selected" by a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. 16 The term "designated" refers to a majority showing by labor organization through signatures on a petition or authorization or a petition. 17 Voluntary recognition by employers is relatively common in private firms. By contrast, under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), administered by the FRLA, an employer's voluntary recognition of a majority union does not establish representational authority. The FSLMRS defines the "exclusive representative" as the labor organization which is "(A) certified as the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit pursuant to [ To consider why federal-sector employees vote for union representation, we utilize a conventional cost-benefit analysis. Unless the employee has some pre-existing commitment to unions, perhaps due to family influence or past experience, 21 the employee will vote for union representation only if the benefits of such representation outweigh the attendant costs.
A. Benefits of Union Representation
We turn first to the benefits side of the equation. An important benefit unions can provide is a measure of due process on the job. Unrepresented federal employees have a statutory mechanism for challenging a discharge or serious discipline by filing an appeal with the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB), an independent agency that Congress created to protect the merit principles of the federal civil service system. Employees eligible for such review must be non-probationary employees in the "competitive service" or "excepted service." Id. §7511(a)(1).
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There are several advantages to the NGA route. One is that the union is an experienced advocate in the arbitral forum and provides representation that is at least as effective, and certainly less costly, than the lawyer who might have to be retained to ensure appropriate consideration of the claim in the MSPB process. A second benefit of the negotiated procedure is that it provides a single forum for nearly all of the claims the employee may have arising out of the adverse agency action; no other forum can hear both contractual grievances and statutory claims. 25 Finally, the arbitral route is less risky than the administrative route at the MSPB because the arbitrator is jointly selected by, and needs to remain acceptable to both, the agency and the union, if the arbitrator hopes to be selected again in future cases. Interestingly, unlike the rule in the private sector and many state and local government laws, adverse arbitration awards generally can be appealed to the FLRA.
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The collective bargaining agreement, though its scope is narrower than agreements in the private sector and many state and local governments where bargaining is permitted over wages and major employee benefits, still provides advantages that accrue to working in a union-represented facility. Even if, for example, we consider the constrained scope of bargaining involving TSA airport screeners, 27 that agreement provides, 23 . Some employees are covered by other personnel systems. This includes employees of the Federal Aviation Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, health-care professionals in the VA, and overseas teachers of the Department of Defense Dependent Schools. These systems also allow the employee to elect between the negotiated procedure and the administrative remedy. See U.S.
FED. LABOR RELATIONS AUTH., GUIDE TO ARBITRATION UNDER THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE 1-3 (2013).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(e)(1). (Feb. 4, 2011) , available at <https://w ww.tsa.gov/news/releases/2011/02/04/tsa-administrator-pistole%E2%80%99s-decision-collectiv ebargaining> ("Should officers choose a union, Administrator Pistole would allow bargaining on limited, non-security issues relating to employment including shift bids, transfers and awards. Bargaining on any issues related to security would be strictly prohibited. For example, bargaining would not be allowed on security policies, procedures or the deployment of security personnel or equipment, pay, pensions and any form of compensation, proficiency testing, job qualifications or discipline standards.").
Consider also the role of the election-of-remedies provisions in 5 U.S.C. § 7127(d)-(e
inter alia, (1) procedures and principles governing the performance appraisal process, whereby employees "may grieve their final end-of-year performance rating" (Art. 1); 28 procedures and eligibility for employee recognition awards (Art. 2); 29 procedures and eligibility for leaves and comparable time (Art. 3) ; 30 procedures for bidding on shifts and screening lines, trading of shifts, and transfers to other areas of covered facilities (Arts. 4-6); 31 procedures for changing one's status from full-time to parttime and vice versa (Art. 7); 32 a uniform allowance and rules for various special items (Art. 8);
33 process and eligibility for special assignments (Art. 9); 34 and break rooms, protective gear, nursing facilities, and union access (Art. 10).
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In other federal collective agreements, the parties negotiate over merit pay and promotion, 36 parking spaces and reimbursement of employee parking for use of private vehicles for agency purposes, 37 procedures for employer investigations of misconduct, 38 leave sharing, flexible work place 39 and telework policies, 40 and consideration of seniority in deciding which employees will be affected by staff reductions. 41 If the parties cannot reach agreement, they can invoke a form of interest arbitration through the offices of the Federal Services Impasse Panel (FSIP), which is a unit of the FLRA. In addition to negotiating collective agreements, federal unions establish political action committees 43 and play a role in articulating employee concerns in particular agencies and across the government, 44 and in proposing and commenting on federal personnel policy developments, such as comparability pay adjustments, 45 new overtime pay arrangements, 46 and new wage garnishment procedures. 47 Finally, these unions provide various benefits for members only. The AFGE, for example, provides discounted prescription coverage, dental services, life insurance, and legal services including a free initial consultation.
B. Costs of Union Representation
We now turn to the costs of union representation. In the private sector, employees have to think long and hard about whether to be represented by a union because of likely employer opposition. Many commentators focus on unlawful employer opposition -threats of retaliation or actual discharge or discipline of union supporters. This can be a factor. But there is also the influence of lawful employer opposition. For the individual non-union firm, a union represents the prospect of net additional costs because the union will likely seek a higher wage, more generous employee benefits, and buffers against employer discipline not present in the union's absence. In what I have called "Gompers 101" in other writings, 48 an effective union will try to neutralize these additional costs by imposing them, or presenting a likely prospect they will be imposed, on competitors in the same product market.
The perspective of the average employee is not often very different from that of the firm. Even if the employee may otherwise support union representation, the employee is going to worry about the adverse consequences for the firm. A rational employee has to evaluate the effectiveness of the union bargaining agency against the risks that bargaining gains or the policies of the union will undermine job security and firm profitability.
In the federal sector, by contrast, the employer-opposition factor is virtually non-existent. While few federal agencies affirmatively welcome the constraints on managerial flexibility involved in a collective bargaining agreement, they are not likely to seek to incur the political risks of a long drawn-out battle with the organizing union. This is certainly true in Democratic administrations but is also the case during most Republican administrations.
49
In addition to the political factor, the federal agency, like nearly all public employers, does not face product-market competition. There are few substitutes for most government services and the federal agency faces a quite limited risk that the union's gains at the bargaining table will lead to cuts in appropriations for the agency. 50 Indeed, because the federal government does not permit, in most cases, collective bargaining over compensation and most employee benefits, the costs of an agreement are often not large and, in any event, not readily apparent to the public.
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Aside from these factors, which tend to dull the willingness of the federal agency to fight a unionization campaign, employees have strong statutory civil-service protections against unfair discharge or other discipline. It may be an overstatement but there is some force to the general perception of non-probationary federal civil service employees that their jobs are secure for the entirety of their careers.
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Union representation also entails payment of union dues or an agency fee. In sum, for the employee considering a vote for union representation, the benefits are modest but not trivial, 61 the direct financial cost is about $250 a year, and there is little risk that union policies or actions will jeopardize the employee's job security. 62 
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PARADOX Table 3 sets forth what might be termed the "free rider effect" -the percentage of employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement who voluntarily pay union dues or an agency fee.
63 About one-fifth of represented non-postal federal employees do not pay for the costs of union representation. This is a higher degree of free riding than we see in the postal sector but it is lower than one would expect given the fact that unions have a statutory duty of fair representation (DFR) to all employees in the unit, union security clauses are not enforceable, and any duescheckoff authorization can be revoked after one year.
One explanation for this lower than expected free-rider effect may be that some employees fear that the union's DFR works differently in practice than in theory. If the employee puts an affirmative value on being able to utilize the negotiated grievance procedure if disciplined or unhappy with a job assignment, the employee may believe that the effectiveness of that option will depend on the energy and initiative union stewards and other representatives demonstrate in how they investigate the case and whether the union will, ultimately, invoke arbitration.
Having a union representative also may aid the employee at the prediscipline stage, where the employer is engaged in an investigation that the employee "reasonably believes . . . may result in disciplinary action against the employee . . . ." 64 The employee has a statutory right to be represented by the union at such investigations.
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A second factor may be peer pressure. Because the union or its supporters may be involved in soliciting the initial dues-checkoff authorization from the employee, the employees who want to "free ride" will be not be able to do so in secret. And to be able to revoke a checkoff authorization at the year's end, the employees may be required by the collective bargaining agreement to notify the union. 66 Employees may not even be aware of, or may not recall, their statutory right to revoke a prior dues-checkoff authorization or when they must do so to prevent deductions for another year.
In the postal sector, the unions have negotiated a contractual right to 63 . Recall that CPS coverage data regarding government employees who are not union members working in "right to work" jurisdictions may be problematic. See supra note 12.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 7114. 65. 5 U.S.C. § 7112(a)(2)(B). 66. See supra note 15. Form 1188 expressly states that a copy of the document is "forwarded by the payroll office to the labor organization in accordance with the arrangement between the agency and the labor organization." EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 19:nn address employees in any orientation program for new career or non-career employees. 67 This increases acceptability of the union and peer pressure. In the end, however, there is the influence of moral suasion or solidarity. Some people have an affirmative preference to share the costs of an institution that is operating as a responsive agent and is clearly benefiting them and their colleagues. This is surely the case in the postal sector and in other settings across the country where union security clauses are not enforceable. In the absence of a union-security clause, unions have to work harder to attract and retain membership.
68 This is not a bad thing, but it does require the expenditure of union resources, and some people will simply insist on a free ride. All other things being equal, the union may be a good deal less effective in representing employees than it otherwise would be if fully financed. Federal-sector unionism is a paradox. Despite the outlawry of unionsecurity provisions and strikes, sharp limits on the scope of collective bargaining (outside the U.S. Postal Service and airport air traffic controllers), and the absence of card-check certification, a good number of federal employees join unions and pay dues. The union membership rate is lower than in state and local governments but considerably higher than in the private sector. Somewhat fewer employees pay dues than are covered by collective agreements but the free-rider effect is smaller than one would expect. The federal sector suggests a model of relatively low-stakes unionism and collective bargaining that perhaps should be considered as an alternative by labor organizations and policymakers. The federal-sector model may, however, require certain features that are not readily replicable in the private sector: the absence of a right to strike in favor of some measure of interest arbitration as a deadlock-breaking device, an absence of employer opposition, and statutory employment protections.
